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Paternal provisioning among humans is puzzling because it is
rare among primates and absent in nonhuman apes and because
emergent provisioning would have been subject to paternity
theft. A provisioning “dad” loses fitness at the hands of nonpro-
visioning, mate-seeking “cads.” Recent models require exacting
interplay between male provisioning and female choice to over-
come this social dilemma. We instead posit that ecological change
favored widespread improvements in male provisioning incen-
tives, and we show theoretically how social obstacles to male
provisioning can be overcome. Greater availability of energet-
ically rich, difficult-to-acquire foods enhances female–male and
male–male complementarities, thus altering the fitness of dads
versus cads. We identify a tipping point where gains from provi-
sioning overcome costs from paternity uncertainty and the dad
strategy becomes viable. Stable polymorphic states are possible,
meaning that dads need not necessarily eliminate cads. Our sim-
ulations suggest that with sufficient complementarities, dads can
emerge even in the face of high paternity uncertainty. Our the-
oretical focus on ecological change as a primary factor affecting
the trade-off between male mating and parenting effort suggests
different possibilities for using paleo-climatic, archaeological, and
genomic evidence to establish the timing of and conditions asso-
ciated with emergence of paternal provisioning in the hominin
lineage.
paternal care | fatherhood | human evolution | parental investment |
cooperation
The mating–parenting system among modern human hunter-gatherers is unique among mammals. Human hunter-
gatherers also occupy a unique ecological niche. The follow-
ing social and ecological characteristics are distinctive among
humans: 1) They live in multimale, multifemale groups in which
the majority of adults are mated in socially recognized pair
bonds (mean % unions monogamous = 92%, SD = 12, n =
339 foraging societies) (1); 2) labor differs by sex, in which
females specialize in childcare, gathering and food processing,
and males in hunting and/or fishing (2); 3) offspring are provi-
sioned by men and women, often parents, throughout childhood
and adolescence, with men providing the majority of calo-
ries (mean % calories provided by men = 66%, SD = 18,
n = 9 foraging societies) (3); and 4) families include multiple
dependent young of different ages (4). This mating–parenting
system differs dramatically from that of the three great ape
species to which we are most closely related, chimpanzees, bono-
bos, and gorillas, who are either promiscuous or polygynous
and lack male provisioning. If the mating–parenting system of
our last common ancestor resembled that of our closest rela-
tives (5–8), then how did extensive male provisioning evolve in
our species?
Understanding the selection pressures underlying the evolu-
tionary transition from no to extensive paternal provisioning is
especially challenging in light of the “social dilemma” that would
undermine fitness benefits of incipient male provisioning. Pater-
nal care does not occur in a vacuum but instead depends on what
other males do. Suppose a genetic variant arose in an ancestral
nonprovisioning male, predisposing him to provision the off-
spring of a female with whom he mated, rather than consume the
food himself. Promiscuity or dominance-based polygyny implies
a low probability that he is the biological father of the offspring,
meaning that his investments would increase the fitness of others
who did not carry the novel genetic variant, thus preventing its
spread.∗
Gavrilets (7) argued that perhaps the only way this dilemma
could be overcome is if females were to offer preferential
mating and faithfulness to males who provision them or their
offspring. Lesser-ranked males might have a comparative advan-
tage in provisioning rather than competing for mates, but their
paternal investments would somehow have to attract devoted
females. Chimpanzee behavior suggests slim odds for this path
to paternal provisioning. Notwithstanding reports of exchanges
of meat for sex (9, 10), a detailed review (11) casts doubt on
the notion that provisioning buys sexual access. Rather, pre-
vailing evidence points to rank and aggression as key deter-
minants of chimpanzee male reproductive success (12). Even
if exchange of meat for sex were to constitute an incipient
reproductive strategy, there would still be the social dilemma
to contend with. This scenario also requires simultaneous evo-
lutionary changes in both sexes.† Instead, we address the
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social dilemma by considering ecological factors that affect
the fitness benefits and costs of alternative male reproductive
strategies.
This paper presents an ecological theory of the evolution of
paternal provisioning in our species that depends only on selec-
tion on males (Fig. 1). We propose that the drying of the African
savanna in the Late Pliocene and Early Pleistocene—with asso-
ciated increases in mammalian biomass, tubers, and nuts and
decreases in ripe fruit availability—gradually resulted in obli-
gate bipedality, increased mobility, prey encounter rates, and
returns to hunting and extractive foraging. Those changes in
the profitability of different ecological strategies selected for
increased brain size, greater time devoted to learning and cul-
tural innovation, and lengthening of the juvenile period (3).
Those changes in ecology and life history generated new sources
of female–male complementarity in producing surviving off-
spring and male–male complementarity in acquiring and sharing
food (4, 14).
Complementarities between males and females, i.e., synergis-
tic effects that increase per capita benefits, arose from the gains
to male specialization in hunting and female specialization in
activities compatible with offspring care. Because hunting is not
easily compatible with existing primate adaptations to lactation
and carrying infants, and because hunting skill is acquired over a
long period of practice, there were significant gains from a sexual
division of labor (14, 15). Altriciality, prolonged development,
and the simultaneous dependence of multiple offspring ampli-
fied these gains. Since hunted foods tend to be dispersed and rich
in protein, fat, and certain micronutrients (e.g., zinc, B vitamins),
while the foods gathered by females tend to be rich in carbohy-
drates and spatially segregated from hunted foods, female–male
synergies also arose directly from the dietary complementarity
of different macro- and micronutrient inputs to an omnivorous
diet (16).
Greater dietary reliance on animal products also generated
complementarities between males in producing and sharing
food. Returns to scale in cooperative prey capture allowed
hunters to achieve higher per capita return rates (14). Highly
variable success rates in hunting also generated returns to food
sharing that buffered risk and smoothed variability in con-
sumption over time (4). Reducing risk through food sharing
was essential to the long-term sustainability of omnivorous for-
ager diets that include high-risk, high-reward foods such as
large game.
We present a simple evolutionary game theoretic model that
shows how these complementarities between women and men
and among men can select for male provisioning, even when
paternity is not fully certain. The model connects ecology to
male reproductive strategies to predict the effect of ecological
change on the evolution of paternal provisioning. Reproduc-
tive strategies are modeled by imagining the behavior of pairs
of male neighbors. Males are of two types, “cads,” who do
not provision offspring and who mate with multiple females,
and “dads,” who do provision offspring and who mate with
only one female. In an initial population predominated by cads,
a variant dad paired with a cad would have lower reproduc-
tive success than his neighbor. Following ecological change that
increases the synergistic benefits of cooperation (complementar-
ities) between sexes and between males, changes in the fitness
of dads and cads select for male provisioning. We show that
these forces can be strong enough to coexist with an appre-
ciable degree of extrapair mating, so that complete monogamy
is not necessary for the initiation and maintenance of paternal
provisioning.
Model
We model a population in which males and females in each
generation interact in groups; each female has a mate, but she
can also copulate with other males. For analytical simplicity,
we consider groups with two males and two females each. The
males forage together and share the outcome equally. We envi-
sion two types of males, dads (nonphilandering provisioners) and
cads (philandering nonprovisioners). A dad favors his mate’s off-
spring’s survival by sharing some of his food with them and his
mate. In contrast, a cad uses extrapair matings rather than provi-
sioning to increase his reproductive success. This is the primary
tension in the model. Complex foraging enhances dads’ repro-
ductive success (i.e., offspring survivorship) because dads are
more adept at exploiting its inherent complementarities. The
model examines whether enhanced offspring survival prospects
can allow the dad trait to spread in an ancestral environment of
promiscuity, i.e., in a population where almost all dads have a
cad as a neighbor.
Importantly, we suppress the evolution of female faithful-
ness to focus on the interplay between ecological change and
male reproductive behavior in overcoming the social dilemma.
Specifically, we take all females to be identical within and across
generations in terms of fertility, ability to care for offspring,
and openness to extrapair matings. (It is reasonable to imag-
ine scenarios, not considered here, whereby male provisioning
and female faithfulness coevolve, but only after the initial social
dilemma has been overcome.).
Fig. 1. An ecological theory for the evolution of male provisioning in the hominin lineage.
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Male–Male Interactions. The model focuses entirely on variation
in male reproductive strategies. Assuming that the groups of
males and females are randomly formed, we formalize the inter-
action between neighboring males as an evolutionary game with
two strategies or types—the aforementioned dad (D) and cad
(C ). Let πij denote the reproductive success of a male of type
i =D ,C whose neighbor is of type j =D ,C . The payoff matrix
of the evolutionary game is shown in Fig. 2 (since the game is
symmetric, the matrix shows only the reproductive success of the
row player).
Assume, for simplicity, that each adult female gives birth to
the same number 2N of offspring (N males and N females). All
of the females being identical, a male’s reproductive success—
the number of his biological offspring who survive to sex-
ual maturity—is then wholly determined by offspring survival
probabilities and female openness to extrapair matings. Since
neighboring males forage together, there may be male–male
complementarities in production (described in detail below).
Hence, while the survival probability of a male’s mate’s offspring
depends on whether he is a provisioning dad or a philander-
ing cad, it may also depend on whether his neighbor is a dad
or a cad. Accordingly, we write sij for the survival probabil-
ity of the offspring of a female whose mate has type i =C ,D
and whose neighboring male has type j =C ,D . Turning to
extrapair matings, dads spend less time philandering than do
cads. Here we make the extreme assumption that dads engage
in no extrapair copulations at all (although unrealistic, the
assumption is conservative since it reduces the odds that dad
genes spread). Thus, let φ∈ [0, 1] denote the share of copu-
latary acts that a female concedes to the neighbor if he is a
cad, while 1 − φ is the share alloted to her mate. The repro-
ductive successes πij , i , j =C ,D , are then given by the following
expressions:
πCC = [(1−φ) · sCC +φ · sCC ]· 2N = sCC · 2N [1]
πCD = (sCD +φ · sDC )· 2N [2]
πDC = (1−φ)· sDC · 2N [3]
πDD = sDD · 2N . [4]
A cad matched with another cad poaches as much paternity from
his neighbor as his neighbor does from him, on average (Eq. 1).
A cad matched with a dad steals, on average, a share φ of the
offspring born to his neighbor and faces no paternity uncertainty
himself (Eqs. 2 and 3). A dad matched with a dad faces no pater-
nity uncertainty. Each dad devotes all of his time to producing
food and other types of care for his offspring; this explains Eq. 4.
[Note that the Fisher condition, sensu Houston and McNamara
(17), holds.]
Shares of Dads and Cads. Let dt ∈ [0, 1] denote the share of dads
among males at time t . In an infinitely large population, the repli-
cator dynamic ḋt (18, 19)—the rate of change in the share of dads
at time t—is written
ḋt = dt · (1− dt)· [π̄D(dt)− π̄C (dt)], [5]
Fig. 2. The payoff matrix of the dad–cad game.
where the term in the square brackets indicates that the ultimate
evolutionary success of dads versus cads depends on the average
reproductive success of each strategy, given by
π̄D(dt) = dt ·πDD + (1− dt) ·πDC [6]
and
π̄C (dt) = dt ·πCD + (1− dt) ·πCC . [7]
In a population with both male types present (i.e., where
dt (1− dt)> 0), the share of dads thus increases (ḋt > 0) if dads
achieve a higher reproductive success on average than cads; it
decreases (ḋt < 0) if cads achieve a higher average reproductive
success than dads; and it remains constant (ḋt = 0) if both types
achieve the same average reproductive success. Rewriting the
difference π̄D(dt)− π̄C (dt) as
dt · (πDD −πCD)+ (1− dt) · (πDC −πCC ) [8]
reveals that the signs of πDD −πCD and πDC −πCC are crucial.
For example, if πDD <πCD and πDC <πCC , then a cad’s repro-
ductive success exceeds that of a dad regardless of whether the
neighbor is a dad or a cad, and the share of dads will decrease.
By contrast, if πDD >πCD and πDC >πCC , then dads always
outperform cads and the share of dads will increase.
We are interested in values of d that are asymptotically sta-
ble states; the replicator dynamic brings the share of dads back
toward these states if the share of dads is slightly perturbed
away from d (ref. 20, p. 243). From the reproductive success
values given in Eqs. 1–4, and ignoring knife-edge cases where
πDD =πCD and/or πDC =πCC , the replicator dynamic gives rise
to four distinct game classes, each with qualitatively different
asymptotically stable states (Fig. 3):
• Game class [cads] obtains if sCD +φ · sDC > sDD and
sCC > (1−φ) · sDC . Regardless of the neighbor’s type, a cad’s
reproductive success exceeds that of a dad, and the unique
asymptotically stable state has only cads: d = 0.
• Game class [dads] obtains if sDD > sCD +φ · sDC and
(1−φ) · sDC > sCC . Regardless of the neighbor’s type, a dad’s
reproductive success exceeds that of a cad, and the unique
asymptotically stable state has only dads: d = 1.
• Game class [cads and dads] obtains if sCD +φ · sDC > sDD and
(1−φ) · sDC > sCC . It is preferable to be a cad when matched
with a dad and a dad when matched with a cad. This asymmetry
implies that there is a unique asymptotically stable state, which
is polymorphic: d = πDC−πCC
πDC−πCC+πCD−πDD
= (1−φ)sDC−sCC
sDC−sCC+sCD−sDD
.
• Game class [cads or dads] obtains if sDD > sCD +φ · sDC and
sCC > (1−φ) · sDC . Being matched with a male of the same
type is always better than being matched with a male of a
different type. Both monomorphic states are asymptotically
stable: d = 0 or d = 1.
With these concepts in hand, our question can be expressed
formally as follows: In a population initially predominated by
cads, and where d = 0 is an asymptotically stable state, what
could cause the share of dads to increase over time? If d = 0 is
asymptotically stable, and initially dt ' 0, then the share of dads
will decline over time, getting closer to d = 0. This will remain
true as long as the reproductive successes of dads versus cads
remain unchanged. However, changes in reproductive successes
can alter the prospects for dads; if large enough, they can stimu-
late transitions between game classes that favor increases in the
share of dads. We illustrate this with two examples.
First, suppose that initially the game class is [cads] and
that suddenly the inequality sCC > (1−φ) · sDC switches to
sCC < (1−φ) · sDC while the inequality sCD +φ · sDC > sDD
continues to hold. This switch is literally “game changing”: The
game class transitions from [cads] to [cads and dads]. The repli-
cator dynamic, whose sign hinges on the sign of [8], switches
10748 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1917166117 Alger et al.
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0
+ Game class Game class
Game class Game class
[Cads] [Cads-or-Dads]
[Cads-and-Dads] [Dads]
Fig. 3. The evolutionary game class, which determines whether the share
of dads in the population increases or decreases over time, depends on the
difference πDD−πCD (the horizontal axis) and the difference πCC −πDC (the
vertical axis).
from negative to positive. The share of dads will keep increasing
toward the asymptotically stable state d = (1−φ)sDC−sCC
sDC−sCC+sCD−sDD
.
Second, again start with dt ' 0 but now suppose the initial
game class is [cads or dads] and that suddenly the inequal-
ity sCC > (1−φ) · sDC switches to sCC < (1−φ) · sDC while the
inequality sDD > sCD +φ · sDC continues to hold. Then the game
class transitions from [cads or dads] to [dads]: The replicator
dynamic becomes positive, and the share of dads will increase
toward the asymptotically stable state d = 1.
Given that female openness to extrapair copulations φ is
constant, such transitions between game classes can only be
driven by changes in offspring survival probabilities. The key
point of our analysis below is that enhanced female–male and
male–male complementarities in production can trigger pre-
cisely such changes. We now describe how we model these
complementarities.
Complementarities and Survival. Let s(x , y) denote the survival
probability of an offspring who receives resources x from its
mother and whose mother’s mate brings the amount of food y
back to the mother–offspring pair. Central to our model is that
dads provision more than cads. For simplicity, and without los-
ing anything essential, we assume that cads do no provisioning
at all.‡
To highlight the role of complementarities, as distinct from
forces such as increasing or decreasing returns to inputs, we
adopt a survival function with constant returns to male and
female inputs,
s (x , y)=
x + (1−κ) · y +κ · x · y
A
, [9]
where A> 0 is a constant large enough for s to be smaller than
one, and where x > 1 (this ensures that the female’s contribution
cannot reduce the value of the male’s contribution). The param-
‡Having cads provision a positive amount complicates the analysis without affecting
the qualitative results. Furthermore, no paternal provisioning is arguably a reasonable
ancestral benchmark given its absence in nonhuman apes.
eter κ∈ [0, 1]measures the female–male complementarity. There
is no complementarity if κ= 0: Only the sum of x and y matters.
The complementarity is present and increasing in κ if κ> 0. This
is revealed by the sign of the cross-partial derivative
∂2s (x , y)
∂x∂y
=
κ
A
. [10]
The positive sign of this expression implies that when κ> 0,
resources provided by one sex increase the value of resources
provided by the other.
Neighboring males forage together and equally share the col-
lectively produced food. Using yDD and yDC to denote the
amount of food that a dad brings to his mate and her offspring
when his neighbor is a dad and a cad, respectively, let
yDD =
(1−µ)· 2YD +µ ·Y 2D
2
[11]
yDC =
(1−µ)· (YD +YC )+µ ·YDYC
2
. [12]
YD ≥ 2 and YC ≥ 2 measure the productivity of the two types
of males in procuring food: While all males may spend the
same amount of time producing food together, we allow for
the possibility that time spent by cads and dads could differ in
productivity.
The parameter µ∈ [0, 1]measures the male–male complemen-
tarity in food production. If µ= 0, there is no complementarity:
Only the sum of YD and YC matters. If µ= 1, the complemen-
tarity is maximal: Only their product matters (since when YD ≥ 2
and YC ≥ 2, the product YDYj , j =D ,C , is at least as large as
the sum). The 2 in the denominator of Eqs. 11 and 12 means that
the food is shared equally between the two males.
How do ecological changes in µ and κ confer an evolutionary
advantage to dads? And what are the effects of paternity uncer-
tainty (φ) and cad–dad differences in productivity (YC −YD ),
if any? The next section (Results) answers these questions by
reporting results based on analysis in SI Appendix, Lemmas 1 and
2 and Propositions 1–10. We also conduct simulations of finite
populations to illustrate the plausible emergence of dads as a
result of ecological change.
Results
Complementarities Favor the Spread of Dads. Keeping the param-
eters for male contributions (YD and YC ) and female extrapair
copulations (φ) fixed, increases in female–male complementarity
(κ) and/or male–male complementarity (µ) can cause the share
of dads to increase over time in a population initially predom-
inated by cads. This is easiest to see when dads and dads are
equally productive (YC =YD ). In this case, a dad brings to his
mate–offspring pair the same amount of food whether matched
with a dad or a cad (yDC = yDD = yD ), so that sDC = sDD = sD .
We show in SI Appendix, Lemma 1 that the game class is then
either [cads] or [dads] and that the game class switches from
[cads] to [dads] if the following expression switches from being
negative to being positive:
sD(1−φ)− sC . [13]
A shift from [cads] to [dads] thus requires either an increase in
sD(1−φ) or a decrease in sC .
Can an increase in κ tip outcomes in favor of dads and achieve
such a change? Yes. Because nonpaternity is held constant, and
cads do not invest in a mate or her offspring, neither φ nor sC
changes with κ. In contrast, for any given amount provisioning
Alger et al. PNAS | May 19, 2020 | vol. 117 | no. 20 | 10749
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from the mother, x , and from the dad, yD , the survival of a dad’s
mate’s offspring, sD , is strictly increasing in κ:
∂sD
∂κ
> 0 [14]
(SI Appendix, Lemmas 1 and 2, Proposition 1, and Fig. S2). Thus,
all else equal, when YC =YD , a sufficient increase in female–
male complementarity, κ, is enough for dads to outcompete cads.
This is intuitive: An increase in κ renders the food contribution
yD from dads more valuable, and the fitness of dads relative to
cads increases.
Can increasing µ tip the balance in favor of dads? Yes. An
increase in µ entails an increase in dads’ provisioning, yD , and
this has a positive impact on offspring survival, sD :
dsD
dµ
=
∂sD
∂yD
· ∂yD
∂µ
> 0 [15]
(SI Appendix, Lemmas 1 and 2, Proposition 1, and Proof of Propo-
sitions 7 and 8). As a result, all else equal, when YC =YD , a
sufficient increase in male–male complementarity, µ, is enough
for dads to spread. In other words, greater male–male comple-
mentarity increases the food contributed by dads to a mate and
her offspring, resulting in higher fitness for dads relative to cads.
More generally, whether cads and dads are equally produc-
tive or not (YC =YD , YC >YD , or YD >YC ), an increase in
κ and/or µ increases the survival probability of offspring provi-
sioned by dads. This generally contributes to dads’ reproductive
success in the sense that if the effect is pronounced enough, the
game will switch from class [cads] to one of the other three game
classes. While this is intuitive, it is by no means trivial, since an
increase in the survival probability of offspring provisioned by
dads also means that the value of stealing paternity increases.
In fact, when both YC >YD and φ are large, an increase in κ
and/or µ can favor cads by inducing a switch from game class
[dads] to [cads and dads] (but not to [cads]). However, this is
the only exception to the rule that complementarities favor dads.
(See SI Appendix, Propositions 4 and 5 and Propositions 7–10,
which describe a slightly more general model that includes a
parameter δ ∈ [0, 1] that represents the share of the collected
food that a dad brings back to his mate and her offspring;
an increase in δ has effects in the same direction as increases
in κ or µ.
The potential for complementarities to underwrite the evo-
lution of dads is borne out in numerical simulations of finite
populations. Fig. 4 shows two simulations of the evolution of
dads over 100,000 generations. Each simulation begins with a
population of all cads (d = 0), no complementarities (κ=µ= 0),
and a small (10−4) probability of mutation between male types.
In rough correspondence with existing prehistoric evidence (Dis-
cussion), the simulation posits that complementarities κ and µ
increase at two points in time: first around 2 Mya (correspond-
ing roughly to an increase by Homo in dietary reliance on animal
products from hunting and scavenging) and again around 400 kya
(emergence of Homo sapiens and habitual use of technology [e.g.,
controlled fire, bifacial hand axes] to more efficiently harvest and
process faunal remains).
Fig. 4, Top shows the evolutionary trajectory of a popula-
tion in which cads and dads have equal productivity (YC =YD ).
Once κ and µ approach 1/4 around 2 Mya, the sign of Eq.
13 switches from negative to positive, and selection begins to
favor dads, despite their relative scarcity. Within a number of
generations, dads compose the near entirety of the popula-
tion. Fig. 4, Bottom illustrates a case in which cads contribute
relatively more to group production (YC >YD ). Under this con-
dition, the first ecological and behavioral shift around 2 Mya
(increased availability, acquisition, and consumption of animal
Time
3mya 2mya 1mya present
D
ad
s
0
1
Increasing
complementarities
Increasing
 comple-
mentarities
Time
3mya 2mya 1mya present
D
ad
s
0
1
Increasing
complementarities
Increasing
 comple-
mentarities
Fig. 4. Increases in complementarities allow the evolution of dads. The plot
shows the frequency of dads in two simulated populations of 2,000 males
over 100,000 generations with nonpaternity held fixed at φ= 1/2. Comple-
mentarities (κ and µ) begin at 0 and increase at two points in time: from 0 to
1/4 around 2 Mya and from 1/4 to 1/2 around 400 kya. (Top) YC = YD = 2.5.
(Bottom) YC = 5, YD = 2.5. In both Top and Bottom, x = 5, A = 20, mutation
probability = 10−4.
products) induces the game class to transition from [cads] to
[cads and dads]. As a result, the share of dads increases and
then fluctuates around the asymptotically stable state d ' 0.55.
The second shift around 400 kya (emergence of H. sapiens and
more efficient acquisition of animal products) further enhances
the viability of dads, but the game remains in the class [cads
and dads]: The share of dads increases and then stabilizes
at the new asymptotically stable state d ' 0.76. These results
confirm that sufficient increases in complementarity push pop-
ulations toward more dad-favorable states within reasonable
evolutionary timescales (even, as in the simulations, in a finite
population and in the presence of stochastic reproduction and
mutations).
Dads Can Thrive Despite High Paternity Uncertainty. The results
reported above do not require low female openness to extrapair
copulations. The simulations in Fig. 4, for example, hold φ con-
stant at 1/2, meaning that 50% of the fertility of any dad whose
neighbor is a cad is diverted to cads. Fig. 5 generalizes this point.
Fig. 5 assumes equal productivity of cads and dads (YC =YD ),
which means that the game class is either [cads] or [dads],
depending on complementarities and nonpaternity (SI Appendix,
Lemma 1). The blank space in the top part of each cube in Fig. 5
represents parameter combinations that result in game class
[cads], where the evolution of dads is suppressed. The multicol-
ored hill, on the other hand, shows the parameter combinations
of κ, µ, and φ that result in game class [dads], where dads are able
to evolve. For any given values of κ and µ, the height of the hill
indicates the maximum degree of paternity uncertainty (φ) that
would still allow the invasion of dads. It is clear that as either
κ or µ increases, the range of allowable paternity uncertainty
10750 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1917166117 Alger et al.
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Fig. 5. The greater the female–male complementarity (κ) and/or the male–male complementarity (µ), the higher the nonpaternity (φ) that dads can
confront yet still prevail. Points inside the multicolored hill favor the evolution of dads, while those in the blank space above it do not. As either female–
male or male–male complementarities increase, dads can evolve at higher levels of nonpaternity. The same plot is displayed from three different angles to
enhance clarity. YD = YC = 2.5; x = 5; A = 20.
grows; in other words, dads can evolve at a higher degree of
paternity uncertainty when there are greater complementarities
(SI Appendix, Proposition 6).
Dad–Cad Polymorphism. The model encompasses the possibility
that a dad’s reproductive success is higher when matched with a
cad than with a dad. Dads gain from cads if cads procure enough
additional food (YC >YD ) to compensate for the paternity they
steal from dads. Such payoffs can lead to a stable dad–cad poly-
morphism, as illustrated in Fig. 4, Bottom. More generally, Fig. 6
shows that YC must strictly exceed YD for such a stable polymor-
phism to arise: If YD ≥YC , the game is never in class [cads and
dads] (SI Appendix, Propositions 2 and 3). Fig. 6 further shows
that a stable dad–cad polymorphism is possible only if comple-
mentarities are strong enough but not too strong (i.e., κ+µ is
neither too small nor too large). Interestingly, when ecological
conditions favor such a mutualism between dads and cads, cads
implicitly “trade” food for sex, but in contrast to the standard
food-for-sex scenario between a male and a female, here the
trade is between males: A cad’s food production increases the
amount of food a dad can provide his mate and her offspring,
and in return the dad is willing to lose paternity.
In our view, YD =YC or YD >YC is the most plausible sce-
nario based on empirical observations of modern human hunter-
gatherers. Hence, our model would need to be enriched to help
understand the factors that can sustain stable dad–cad polymor-
phisms over hominin evolutionary history. Nonetheless, the poly-
morphism described above may be relevant for understanding
the evolution of provisioning in other ecological contexts.
Discussion
Our theory is that ecological changes in the availability of
difficult-to-acquire, energy-dense foods interacted with existing
traits in ancestral hominins to promote foraging specialization
by sex—with males largely acquiring protein- and fat-rich ani-
mal products and females largely gathering carbohydrate-rich
plant-based foods while providing offspring care. This spe-
cialization in turn generated complementarities—both between
males and females and between males—which would have given
a reproductive advantage to provisioning males. The model
reveals the following sufficient conditions for the evolution
of paternal provisioning: 1) Male hunting reliably comple-
ments female gathering and offspring care and/or 2) males
cooperate with each other in the pursuit and/or sharing of
hunted game, generating complementarities in their efforts.
The model results, as displayed in Figs. 4–6, show that suffi-
ciently high female–male and/or male–male complementarities
can enable dads to evolve amid even high probabilities of non-
paternity. The next sections discuss available paleontological
and archeological evidence relevant to the model and the pre-
dictions generated by the theory. The final sections of the
paper discuss the relationship between this model and other
models of paternal care and additional directions for theory
development.
Evidence for Complementarities from the Paleontological and Arche-
ological Record. The fossil and paleo-climatic record provides
clues about specific ecological forces generating complemen-
tarities in the hominin lineage. Since the last shared common
ancestor with chimpanzees (8 to 5 Mya), hominins increas-
ingly inhabited ecologies characterized by high habitat instability;
heterogeneous patterns of vegetation; and long-term trends
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Y D
Y C
-1
0
1
 
[Cads]
[Cads]
[Dads]
[Dads]
[Cads
-or-
Dads]
[Cads
-and-
Dads]
Fig. 6. Complementarities (here shown as the sum of the male–female
complementarity κ and the male–male complementarity µ) and differential
production of dads versus cads (YD−YC ) determine the game class and thus
the asymptotically stable states and evolutionary outcomes. When YD <YC
at intermediate levels of complementarity, the game class is [cads and dads],
meaning that dads and cads coexist in a polymorphic stable state. When
YD≥YC , any stable state is monomorphic. φ= 1/2; YD = 2.5; A = 20; x = 5.
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toward aridity, open habitat, and greater C4 biomass (pri-
marily grasses and sedges) (21). These ecologies promoted
the evolution of hominin morphologies allowing incipient and
ultimately obligate bipedality, including adaptations for ther-
moregulation, locomotor efficiency, and endurance activity.
Varying conditions also favored traits facilitating survival in
shifting environments, including dietary flexibility, migration
to new habitats, and finding novel solutions to environmental
problems (22).
Isotopic studies identify a diverse array of hominin diets incor-
porating a broad range of plant foods during the Mid to Late
Pliocene (∼3.5 Mya) (23, 24). During the Plio-Pleistocene tran-
sition a radiation of hominin species is evident, with species
varying in body size, tooth morphology, brain size, and likely
other features of life histories and social behavior. Some hominin
species would have experienced ecological conditions favoring
greater gains to hunting and learning, which in turn would have
increased inter- and intrasexual complementarities (Fig. 1).
The burgeoning of grazing mammals in eastern and southern
Africa is evident by ∼2.5 to 2 Mya (25, 26) and coincides with a
relative decline in arboreal and frugivorous animals. More open,
arid environments offered a new distribution of nutrients, with
increased abundance of protected plant foods (e.g., nuts, tubers)
and large grassland-adapted mammals (27). Tool cut marks have
been found on large animal bones before∼3 Mya (28), although
evidence of stone tool-assisted foraging is intermittent before
2 Mya. Compared to plant foods, animal foods tended to be
less predictable, require greater foraging distances, and entail
increased energy expenditures. Greater hominin mobility is sug-
gested by the appearance of elongated legs and taller stature
beginning ∼2 Mya.
The first evidence of the cluster of characteristics associ-
ated with complementarities conducive to hominin fatherhood
may be in Homo erectus. In early H. erectus (∼1.8 Mya), the
combination of smaller incisors and molars, a wide range of
dental microwear textural complexity, smaller jaw and gut,
and larger body and brain size (29–31) implies a diverse and
high-quality diet. This diet included a greater proportion of
animal products (32) and plant-based foods requiring tools
to acquire and prepare. The fact that omnivorous hominins
absorbed the energetic costs of transporting stones for pro-
cessing carcasses over long distances (>10 km) (33) suggests
substantial investment in accessing animal tissues. Brain sizes
>700 cc are found after ∼1.8 Mya, along with evidence of
reductions in sexual dimorphism (34) and a modest slowing of
development (22).
H. erectus ontogeny was likely somewhat slower than that
of Australopithecus and modern chimpanzees, but considerably
faster than in modern humans (22, 35, 36). Slower maturation
might imply postlactational offspring provisioning, particularly
if coupled with an earlier age at weaning (37). Given a lack of
evidence for protracted growth (e.g., ref. 38) or an adolescent
growth spurt, it is possible that fully modern human life histories
had yet to evolve by 1.5 Mya. Given evidence of very late first
molar eruption in Neanderthal fossils (but see ref. 38) and typ-
ically modern human hunter-gatherer base camps by 500 to 450
kya (39), it is more certain that extended juvenile dependence
and near-modern brain size were in place by the time of archaic
H. sapiens∼400 kya. Viewed through the lens of the model, these
developments imply that paternal provisioning would also have
evolved in our lineage by this time.
New Research Directions and Predictions Generated by the Model.
Our theory directs attention to critical pieces of evidence that
are missing from the archeological and paleontological record,
providing guidance for additional research. More evidence is
needed on sexual dimorphism in behavior and diet. Contempo-
rary foragers show reduced dimorphism in body size relative to
nonhuman apes, very little dimorphism in diet due to food shar-
ing, and pronounced dimorphism with respect to hunting and
gathering. We need evidence regarding changes in those dimor-
phisms and especially when extensive intersexual food sharing
became prevalent. Similarly, we need additional evidence regard-
ing juvenile development beyond what is known about molar
eruption, which may provide evidence about weaning but not
sources of food or dietary composition. Evidence regarding when
meat becomes an important part of juvenile diets is critical to
determining when paternal provisioning emerges.
Increasingly sophisticated methods for assessing dietary com-
position (e.g., radioisotope analysis) can be applied to existing
and newly discovered fossils to test for sex and age differences
in diet. Paleogenomic data on rates of development and aging
will also shed crucial light on the timing of these changes in
the hominin lineage. There is now a growing body of evidence
of joint neural, hormonal, and behavioral responses underly-
ing transition to fatherhood in modern humans, including lower
testosterone production and sexual drive, higher oxytocin pro-
duction to facilitate bonding, and increased activation in brain
regions important for face emotion processing (40). As we bet-
ter understand the genetic bases of those changes, we can look
to paleogenomics to investigate the emergence of those traits
as well.
Applications to Nonhuman Species. The model provides insights
into the question of why paternal provisioning evolved in humans
but not in other species exposed to the same environmental con-
ditions. The answer begins with the features of the last common
ancestor: intelligent and tool using, with females committed to
carrying offspring and investing in offspring over several years.
Bipedality freed the hands for greater tool use and expanded
the day range for hunting and foraging. Ecological shifts resulted
in a greater abundance of concentrated, valuable food packages
that are difficult and dangerous to obtain. Without sharp canines,
claws, or projectile weapons, early hominin carnivory would have
been limited by the ability to utilize creative strategies to scav-
enge and/or kill game, selecting for increased intelligence and
learning about animal behavior. At the same time, a commit-
ment to caring for and carrying vulnerable young, coupled with
lengthy time requirements for learning complex and flexible for-
aging strategies, would have rendered hunting unprofitable for
females and increased the benefits of male provisioning. These
same conditions would also have favored slowing development
to facilitate the learning process. This is a special constella-
tion of conditions that gave rise to an exceptional level of
paternal provisioning in our species relative to other primates
and mammals.
This model can also be applied to understand more general
conditions associated with paternal investment, which are still far
from well understood (41). It can help explain, for example, why
male provisioning is so uncommon in mammals and so common
in birds. It is interesting to note that the mammalian adapta-
tion is associated with increased investment in offspring survival:
Internal gestation and lactation provide a protective environ-
ment for development, and allow females to combine feeding
with direct offspring care. Those adaptations, however, lower the
scope for female–male complementarity and effectively “crowd
out” male investment. Most species of flying birds, on the other
hand, face a trade-off between acquiring food and protecting vul-
nerable eggs and hatchlings. The young are often vulnerable for
extended periods after hatching until they reach adult body size
and can fly. This situation generates gains from complementary
in the form of turn taking or specialization in feeding and off-
spring care. Our theory predicts that variation in paternal invest-
ment within the mammalian and avian classes will be associated
with variation in complementarity and perhaps opportunities for
extrapair mating.
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Our theory also provides insight into why we still find male
parental investment in birds, despite evidence of extrapair mat-
ing and paternity. Penguins provide an exception that proves
the rule. Penguins have converged with fish-eating mammals
in body form and have lost the ability to fly. However, they
still evidence male parental investment and pair bonding in
response to the need for biparental protection of vulnerable
eggs and young.
Comparison with Other Models of Paternal Investment. In addition
to the model by Gavrilets (7), there is a rich set of theoretical
models of the evolution of parental care—both maternal and
paternal—or lack thereof (42–48; see ref. 49 for a survey). As
in our model, in these models the opportunity cost of provid-
ing care (42) appears as lost mating opportunities (in our model,
provisioning dads have no extrapair copulations while nonpro-
visioning dads do). Compared to this literature, our model
innovates in two major ways.
First, in almost all existing models, offspring survival depends
only on the sum of maternal and paternal care. By contrast,
in our model there are female–male complementarities. While
such complementarities are also present in refs. 43–45, our
model is distinct in that it considers two types of males and also
includes male–male complementarities in food production. Our
model thus sheds light on the interplay between male–female and
male–male complementarities in the evolution of paternal care.
Moreover, an unexpected insight appears, namely, that dads can
benefit from the presence of cads, which can give rise to a stable
polymorphism including both dads and cads.
Second, while we follow in the footsteps of Maynard Smith
(46) and use evolutionary game theory to study the evolu-
tion of paternal care, we do so in a different way. The orig-
inal parental care game studied a population where males
and females are matched to interact and where males and
females are either a guarding type or a deserting type; the
intuition was that deserting males would stand to gain more
than deserting females (46). This modeling strategy, however,
was difficult to reconcile with the Fisher condition (47), which
requires that males and females must on average have the same
number of offspring (see refs. 17 and 48 for excellent discus-
sions). The Fisher condition is fulfilled in our model because
each male spends an equal amount of time with his mate, and
this time may be spent provisioning or seducing his neighbor’s
mate. This allows a straightforward definition of reproduc-
tive success that does not require tracking the time spent in
and out of the mating pool. Moreover, framing the evolution-
ary game as an interaction between males opens the door to
studying male–male complementarities in food production and
sharing.
Directions for Future Research. We have proposed an evolution-
ary game theoretic model to study the evolution of paternal
investment. This model sheds light on how ecological changes
in the distant past may have altered the trade-off between mat-
ing effort and paternal investment and promoted the evolution of
human fatherhood. While this model delivers a rich set of origi-
nal insights, we see several directions in which it could be further
extended.
First, our model focuses on paternal investment in the form of
food provisioning. Male–female and male–male complementar-
ities in other domains, e.g., tool production and domestic tasks,
may be modeled using a similar approach.
Second, our model disregards sexual selection. But what would
happen if females could actively select their mates? The observed
polymorphic equilibrium opens the door to female choice by
generating heterogeneity in male contributions to offspring.
Relatedly, in our model females do not gain anything from
extrapair copulations: What if they obtained extra resources or
genetic benefits that conferred survival advantages for their off-
spring? What level of female willingness to engage in extrapair
copulations would be expected if these traits were subject to
selection? The same ecological conditions that increase the fit-
ness benefits to males from investing in offspring also increase
the benefits to females from receiving that investment. Con-
cealing ovulation is a potential female strategy that could have
reduced rates of male mating competition at the time of ovula-
tion, thereby reducing nonpaternity as the primary brake on male
investment.
Third, since our model disregards relatedness, it would be
interesting to embed the male–male interaction we examine here
in a model with population structure. Moreover, since variance in
male ability and reliability in cooperation could motivate assort-
ment among males, models which allow for male partner choice
are warranted.
Additional questions are, Would model results change if males
interacted in groups of n > 2 individuals rather than in pairs?
How would the presence of grandparents or other alloparents
affect the key trade-offs?
Finally, the model may also be applicable to modern, cultur-
ally variable trends in men’s parenting behavior. Both within and
among populations there is significant variation in family forms,
and the matrifocal family, with limited male paternal investment,
is becoming increasingly prevalent in sectors of societies world-
wide. This variation invites analysis and assessment of whether
variable complementarities may help explain it.
Data Availability. The simulation code is available to readers at
https://github.com/systemsscience/paternal.
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